A buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time. Each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option, abandoning their search or moving on to another seller. We show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price, contravening the Coase conjecture. We then embed the single-seller model into a search framework and show the result provides a foundation for the usual "no haggling" assumption.
The Coase conjecture is a cornerstone of modern microeconomic theory, informing monopoly theory and providing a canonical example of the problem of commitment. The idea is that, for any given price, high value buyers are more likely to purchase than low value buyers, leading to negative selection in the demand pool. Accordingly, the seller cuts its price over time, causing high value buyers to delay their purchases. The seller's inability to commit thus leads its later selves to exert a negative externality on its former selves, reducing its overall profit (Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) ). This idea of negative selection is robust: versions of it hold when costs are nonlinear (Kahn (1986) ), when goods depreciate over time (Bond and Samuelson (1984) ), when there is entry of new buyers (Sobel (1991) ) and when the buyers face future competition (Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) ).
In this paper, we show that the Coase conjecture fails in a natural environment where buyers have an outside option they can choose to exercise. We consider a seller who faces a buyer (or a continuum of buyers) with unknown value for the good and unknown outside option. Each period, the seller chooses price p t ; the buyer then chooses to buy, wait, or exercise his option and terminate the game.
The outside option may come from the possibility of buying another product. For example, when waiting for the price of the iPhone to fall, a customer could instead buy a comparable phone from a competitor. Similarly, when bargaining over the price of a car, a buyer may abandon negotiations and move on to the next dealer. The outside option may also come from pursuing other objectives once the negotiation has terminated. For example, after he finishes bargaining at a bazaar, a tourist could start seeing local attractions.
In Section 1, we take the outside option as exogenous and show that there is unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price equal to the monopoly price against its demand. Intuitively, if the buyer expects the price to stay high then those with low values exercise their outside option and exit the market. As a result, there is no negative selection in the demand pool and no price cut is forthcoming.
To understand why the monopoly pricing equilibrium is unique, suppose prices do fall over time and let u be the lowest net value of types who delay. In the continuation game, the seller will never lower its price below u, since this would leave rents on the table. Type u will thus receive zero utility and should take his outside option in period t = 1, contradicting the assumption that he delays.
The overall idea is that the outside option results in low value types exiting and positive selection in the demand pool. This is very natural: when shopping in a bazaar, a high price quote from a seller is more likely to lead a low value buyer to move on to the next stall rather than wait for a price reduction.
High-priced equilibria have been produced in other durable goods models. Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) show that if the buyer expects an out-of-equilibrium price cut to be followed by Coasian pricing, then one can sustain prices that are arbitrarily high. Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1987) suppose the seller has the option to consume the good and show that if the buyer expects the seller to consume early, he is less willing to delay purchasing, causing the seller to become more pessimistic over time and justifying the belief that the seller consumes early. In both of these cases there are multiple equilibria, including those with Coasian dynamics; in our paper, the monopoly equilibrium is unique.
Analogues to the unravelling logic in our paper have been seen before. In Diamond (1971) , N firms choose prices {p 1 , . . . , p N }, and buyers pay a positive cost to search one more firm; in equilibrium, all firms choose the monopoly price. Both papers feature a holdup problem -a buyer must be rewarded some utility for paying a search cost (or forgoing an outside option) but the seller has the incentive to extract the utility after the buyer has made his decision. Hence the buyer with the lowest utility regrets searching (or forgoing the outside option), leading this behavior to unravel from the bottom. However the models have different implications since Diamond's buyers are held up when they leave a seller, whereas our buyers are held up when they stay. If a firm could make multiple price offers, Diamond's sellers would thus suffer from the Coase problem whereas our would charge the monopoly price. Similar logic is at work in Perry (1986) , in which two parties bargain via alternating offers under two-sided uncertainty. He proves that if there is a known fixed cost of making an offer and no discounting, then the game terminates in a single round. However this result breaks down when discounting is introduced (Cramton (1991) ) or when offer costs are private information (Rubinstein (1985) , Bikhchandani (1992) ), with buyers signaling their types by waiting.
In comparison, our paper considers a Coasian framework, discounting payoffs and allowing both the buyer's valuation and outside option to be private information. 1 We end Section 1 by analyzing the robustness of our monopoly pricing result. In Section 1.1 we show that the result continues to hold even if taking the outside option is reversible. For example, when bargaining at a bazaar, a buyer may return to negotiate after some time has passed. In Section 1.2 we then examine the form of the equilibrium if some types have no outside options, and show that the optimal first-period price converges to the monopoly price as the number of such zero-option types shrinks.
Finally, in Section 2, we endogenize the outside option by considering a model of sequential search. Each period, a buyer chooses whether to stay with the current seller, or move on to an alternative seller where he receives a new value draw; the chosen seller then quotes a sequence of prices over time. In this case, the value from future search opportunities constitutes a buyer's outside option and allows us to apply our monopoly pricing result. In equilibrium, a seller faces buyers who arrive over time, receive one offer, buy if their value is sufficiently high and otherwise move on.
Our model thus shows that even if the Coase conjecture applies to a single seller, it may fail when there are competing sellers who generate an outside option for a buyer. This result complements Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) and Gul (1987) who consider direct competition between pricesetting sellers. These models have multiple equilibria ranging from traditional Bertrand pricing to monopolistic pricing that is sustained through Bertrand punishments. In contrast, our model has a unique equilibrium and does not rely on non-Markovian punishments that might be hard to coordinate. Our monopoly result significantly simplifies the analysis: once we have proved that sellers choose constant prices, the equilibrium is similar to Wolinsky (1986) or Anderson and Renault (1999) , albeit with proportional discounting. One can thus view our results as providing a foundation for Wolinsky's assumption that sellers do not haggle. The timing is as follows: At the start of any period t, the seller chooses price p t ≥ 0. The buyer 1 There are also other related papers. In Compte and Jehiel (2002) , two parties bargain via alternating offers, where one is tempted to mimic a commitment type, but is restrained by the outside option of their opponent. Deb (2010) shows that there is a constant price equilibrium in a Coasian model when buyers' values are stochastic, where the constant renewal of high types prevents the seller from walking down the demand curve.
2 The distribution over (v, w) is not restricted, and may have gaps and atoms; the assumption of bounded support is made to ensure a monopoly price exists. We do require that outside options are bounded below; in Section 1.2 we show that our results are robust to including a small number of zero-option types.
then chooses whether to buy the good, exercise his outside option, or wait. All actions are publicly observable and we allow for mixed strategies. The game continues only if the buyer chooses to wait. Waiting is costly as the buyer and seller discount their utility with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). If the buyer buys the good in period t, he obtains utility δ t (v − p t ) and the seller obtains profit δ t p t . If the buyer exercises the outside option in period t, he obtains utility δ t w and the seller obtains profit 0. If the buyer waits forever, both the seller and buyer obtain 0. A public history of the game -or, for short, history -is any finite sequence of the seller's and buyer's consecutive actions, starting with the first price decision of the seller. 3 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a history-contingent sequence of the seller's offers p t , the buyer's acceptance and exercise decisions, and of updated beliefs about the buyer's values (v, w) such that: actions are optimal given beliefs; beliefs are derived from actions from Bayes' rule whenever possible, including off the equilibrium path; and the seller's actions, even zero-probability actions, do not change its belief about the buyer's type. An equilibrium is essentially unique if all equilibria lead to the same payoffs. Notably, essential uniqueness does not pin down prices off the equilibrium path.
Define u := v −w as the net value of the buyer. Let F (u) be the probability the buyer's net value is strictly below u (which coincides with the cdf when there is no atom) and assume the monopoly price p m ∈ argmax p (1 − F (p)) is unique. 4 The buyer and seller follow monopoly strategies if in every period 1. The seller charges p m ; 2. The buyer buys the good if u ≥ p, and otherwise exercises his outside option.
We first show that in any PBE, prices cannot fall below the lowest net value u at any history. If this did happen then the seller would give type u rents in some periods. When rents are maximal the buyer purchases immediately in any PBE; moreover, raising the price a little would not induce any delay, because of discounting, and is therefore a profitable deviation. Lemma 1. In any PBE, if the seller believes that the buyer's net value is above u at some history, then it charges prices above u at that history.
Proof. Fix a PBE. Let u (h) be the minimum of the support of the seller's belief about the net values of the buyer at history h, and let p (h) be the minimum of the support of prices the seller charges at h. We wish to show that p (h) ≥ u (h) for all histories h. By way of contradiction, assume that p (h) < u (h) for some histories h, and let ∆ = sup h (u (h) − p (h)) > 0 be the least upper bound on undiscounted rents the lowest net-value buyer types can receive. Since prices are nonnegative, ∆ is finite; for any ∈ 0, 1−δ 2 , we can then pick a history h t at time t at which u (h t )−p (h t ) > (1 − ) ∆.
We claim that at history h t the seller puts probability 1 on the buyer immediately buying at any price p ≤ p (h t ) + ∆. At time t, each type prefers to buy now rather than take the outside option because he gets positive rents from buying,
v − p > w > δ s−t w, so each type prefers to buy at t rather that exit in period s > t. Finally, we wish to show that each type prefers to buy at t rather than buy in a future period. To see this, suppose some positive measure set of types did decide to wait and purchase at time s > t, where h s is the resulting continuation of history h t . By Bayes' rule u (h s ) ≥ u (h t ), so the definitions of p and of h t imply that
where the last inequality is self-evident if u (h s )−p (h s ) ≤ 0 and otherwise follows from the definition of ∆ and the assumption that < (1 − δ)/2. Because the types remaining at history h s have values
so all these types prefer to buy at time t rather than delay until time s, contradicting the assumption that some types delay.
Any price p ≤ p (h t ) + ∆ thus leads to an immediate sale.
are not a best response, and p(h t ) is not the minimum of the support of prices the seller charges at h t , contradicting the supposition that ∆ > 0.
There is a PBE in which the buyer and seller use monopoly strategies. This PBE is essentially unique.
Proof. To check that the monopoly strategies form a PBE is straightforward: if the buyer exits or buys in period t = 1, then charging the monopoly price forever is a best response; if the seller charges a constant price, then the buyer will exit or buy in period t = 1.
To demonstrate the payoff-equivalence of all PBE, we claim that in period 1 the buyer either buys or exits, irrespective of the price posted by the seller. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is a PBE and a seller's price p 1 (either on-path or off-path) such that some positive measure subset of types decides to delay, and let u(h 2 ) be the minimum of the support of their net values. Exiting in period t ≥ 2 cannot be better than exiting at t = 1, so a positive measure of types with u < u(h 2 )+ and ∈ 0, 1−δ δ w buy in some period t ≥ 2 with positive probability. Lemma 1 and the consistency of the seller's beliefs implies that p(h t ) ≥ u(h t ) ≥ u(h 2 ), so for u < u(h 2 ) + , we have
where the last inequality uses ≤ 1−δ δ w. Hence these types prefer to exit at t = 1 rather than wait, contradicting the assumption that a positive mass delays.
Thus, for any price p 1 posted by the seller, the buyer either buys or exercises his outside option at time 1 in any PBE. Incentive compatibility for the buyer then implies that the buyer buys if v − p 1 > w and exercises his outside option if v − p 1 < w. An indifferent buyer, v − p 1 = w, can do either if there is measure zero of such types; if there is a positive mass of indifferent types, incentive compatibility for the seller requires that these indifferent types choose to buy with probability 1.
Given the buyer's behavior, the seller maximizes p 1 (1 − F (p 1 )), which has a unique optimum.
Lemma 1 states that the seller will never give any rents to the type with the lowest net valuation u. Proposition 1 uses this to show that type u should take the outside option rather than delay, causing the set of waiting buyers to unravel from the bottom. Since there is no delay for any initial price p 1 , the seller's problem collapses to the static problem.
Proposition 1 has interesting implications for the theory of monopoly pricing. It suggests that sellers may offer a range of heterogeneous products in order to help them commit to high prices.
If a monopolist sells a single product, it will be tempted to cut its price over time via the Coase conjecture. If it also has a second product that appeals to low value customers, this will provide an outside option, clearing out the low end of the market and helping it to commit to the high price.
In addition, the result shows that the seller makes the same profits as if it committed to prices at time t = 1. Hence with outside options, the sequentially optimal mechanism can be implemented in prices, as in Skreta (2006), and coincides with the optimal commitment mechanism. 5 In the model, we suppose there is a single buyer, but one can obtain the same result when the seller sells a continuum of goods to a continuum of buyers with different values and outside options.
As elucidated by Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), this alternative formulation requires that seller's and buyers' actions are the same for any two histories that only differ in acceptance/exit choices of a measure-zero set buyers. While their model does not allow for an exit option, the analysis of the equivalence of the single-buyer and continuum-of-buyers formulations is unchanged.
We now consider two extensions of the basic model.
Reversible Exit
In the baseline model we assumed that if a buyer chooses to exercise the outside option, the game ends and the buyer never returns. This is the right model if the buyer purchases a substitute, however if the buyer simply abandons negotiations then he might return at a later date (e.g. the tourist at the bazaar who wishes to see local sights). Assuming that the buyer receives flow payoff of (1 − δ)w when outside the market and that the seller can see whether the buyer is present, Proposition 1 applies and the seller chooses a single monopoly price. The idea is the same as before: the lowest type u expects to receive no surplus, so there is no point ever returning to the negotiations. To prove the result formally, one can restrict the claim of Lemma 1 to histories at which the buyer is present.
Types with No Outside Option
The baseline model also assumed that the buyer's outside option was bounded below by w > 0. To the contrary, if all types' outside options were equal to zero, we would be back to the standard Coase setting with prices falling over time. One might be concerned that if there were only a few such zero-option types, then it is no longer sequentially optimal for the seller to charge the monopoly price in all periods since we would be in a standard Coasian setting once all the high-option types have exited. However, we show below that the seller's profits change continuously when we add zero-option types.
To gain some intuition, consider the special case where the buyer has w = 0 with probability As α → 0, the mass of delaying types converges to zero and profits converge to those in the static problem. To see why, suppose this were not the case and the set of delaying high-option types converged to [z, x 1 ] with x 1 > z. As α → 0, the seller would work through these types increasingly slowly as the incentive to drop the price below z and sell to the zero-option types decreases. Specifically, since selling to type z would cause a discrete fall in the price, the seller would prefer to subdivide any set [z, x t ] if α is sufficiently small, postponing the price drop and raising revenue from (most of) the remaining high-option types. As a result, τ → ∞ and type z would prefer to exit in period t = 1, contradicting the assumption that a positive mass of high-option types delays.
We now formally show that the equilibrium payoffs are continuous in the distribution of types.
We derive this continuity result in a discretized version of the model in order to avoid measurability issues arising in games with a continuum of types and actions. 7 As before, the seller chooses prices over time, and the buyer chooses whether to buy, wait or take the outside option. The buyer privately knows his value for the good v ∈ V ⊂ [0, v] and the outside option w ∈ W ⊂ [0, w], where v, w are finite. What changes is that (i) we allow the outside option to take value zero and (ii) we discretize the type and action spaces: we restrict the sets V and W to be finite, and assume that there is a lowest monetary unit p 0 and the seller is restricted to post prices p ∈ {kp 0 | k = 0, 1, 2, ...}.
6 If v = 0, then there may be non-Markovian equilibria with higher profits, as in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) . 7 We would like to thank one of the referees for suggesting the discretized approach to the continuity result.
Consider a sequence of cdf distributions G α of (v, w) such that G α → G 0 in distribution as α → 0.
Assume that the limit distribution G 0 has support contained in [0, v] × [w, w] for some w > 0, and has a unique static monopoly price. 8 When defining a PBE, we assume that the seller only puts positive probability on buyerÕs types in the support of G α ; as a result, the model under G 0 is a special case of the baseline model. Such an equilibrium exists for any α by Fudenberg and Levine (1983, Theorem 6.1). In addition, under the limit distribution G 0 , an analogue to Proposition 1 holds when the price grid is sufficiently fine, implying that there is an essentially unique equilibrium.
We then have:
Proposition 2. Assume p 0 is sufficiently small. As α → 0 the PBE payoffs of the buyer and seller converge pointwise to the unique PBE payoff profile at α = 0.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Proposition 2 asserts that the PBE payoffs are upper hemi-continuous as α → 0. While true in our model, this is not a general property of PBE; for example, in Spence's signaling model, payoffs are discontinuous in a separating equilibrium as the mass of low types shrinks to zero. The general problem is that while the limit of equilibrium strategies is optimal given limit beliefs, the PBE beliefs may fail upper hemi-continuity. In our setting, this arises because the limit beliefs at some histories may put positive probability on w < w as α → 0, which is inconsistent with beliefs at α = 0. We thus prove Proposition 2 by showing that Proposition 1, and its discretized analogue, only rely on histories where beliefs are consistent in the limit as α → 0. Roughly, we suppose that high-option types delay with positive probability, prove the seller's beliefs are consistent on these histories, and show that the high-option type with the lowest net value would then prefer to exit.
Proposition 2 considers what happens as α → 0, for a fixed δ. However, the order of limits matters. If δ → 1, for a fixed α, then one would expect that the classic Coase conjecture to obtain.
To understand why, consider the above example where mass α of buyers have w = 0. In a pure strategy equilibrium, buyers will either exit in period t = 1 or stay until they buy. Hence the t ≥ 2 subgame is analogous to a standard Coase model, and there is an equilibrium with Coasian dynamics. As δ → 1, one would thus expect prices to converge to the lowest net value as in Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1987, Theorems 3-4). 9 8 In order for there to be a unique PBE under G 0 , there must be a unique equilibrium to the static game (in which a buyer must either buy the good or take the outside option). With a continuous price space we need only assume there is a unique monopoly price; if there is an atom of buyer types they must all buy else the seller will lower its price. With discrete prices and types, the same is true if the price grid is sufficiently fine. Let p * maximize p`1 − F 0 (p)ó n the grid of prices, where F 0 (p) is the measure of net values v − w strictly below p in the limit distribution G 0 . If there were an atom at p * of size m, and p0 ≤ mp * then there would be at least two monopoly prices, p * and p * − p0, depending on how we break the tie at the atom. Hence the assumption of a unique monopoly price implies that p * does not lie on the grid of net values. 9 There is a subtlety here that is not present in the standard Coase model since the period t ≥ 2 distribution is endogenous, determined by the buyers who delay in t = 1. In particular, the increase in δ raises buyers' continuation values in the t ≥ 2 continuation game, and thus more buyers delay for a fixed p1. While this may affect the rate prices fall as δ → 1, the Coase conjecture applies to the t ≥ 2 subgame even in the worst-case scenario where all high-value buyers delay, i.e. x1 = v, while the introduction of more low-value buyers speeds up convergence.
Search
In Section 1 we examined a single seller facing a single buyer with outside option w. We now 
A buyer purchases if v ≥ v * and otherwise moves onto another seller. The cutoff v * satisfies
Proof. Suppose seller i chooses p i and other sellers charge some distribution of prices inducing continuation value w. We can define a cutoff v * i where a buyer is indifferent between buying from seller i and continuing his search, i.e. v * i − p i = δw. Seller i's profit per buyer is thus proportional to
Profits are weakly negative at the boundaries where v * i ∈ {0, v}, so the optimal cutoff v * i must be interior. Differentiating then yields the necessary first order condition
which is sufficient because the objective is log-concave. Since f (·) has increasing hazard, this equation has a unique solution, implying that any equilibrium must be symmetric, p i = p for all i. In such a symmetric equilibrium the f.o.c. yields (1) as required. The equilibrium cutoff itself satisfies δw = v * − p, or (2). The equilibrium is unique: an increase in p raises the cutoff and, since f (·) has increasing hazard rate, strictly raises the left-hand side of (1).
With competition via sequential search, the Coase conjecture fails and sellers set a constant price; in equilibrium the sellers all choose the same price. The pricing formula (1) says that when seller i lowers its price by , it loses on all its current customers (measure 1) but gains sales from the marginal customers (measure f (v * )) of all those who visit it (measure 1/(1 − F (v * ))).
An increase in δ raises the competition between sellers, lowering prices p. To see this observe that, v * (p; δ) increases in (p; δ) pointwise. Hence an increase in δ implies that p must fall in order for
(1) to be satisfied with equality. In the limit, as δ → 1 we obtain perfect competition: p; δ) )) → ∞ and the equilibrium price converges to 0. 10 From a buyer's perspective, limited competition reduces his utility vis-a-vis no competition since the unwillingness of fellow buyers to wait helps sellers commit to high prices; however, buyers still benefit from lots of competition.
One can extend this result to allow for correlation of buyers' values across sellers. Assume buyers have one of finitely many private types θ ∈ Θ with probability mass function g(θ) and values that are conditionally iid, v i ∼ f (·|θ) with full support on [0, v]. Over time, buyers with higher types tend to leave the market sooner; however, if seller i's prices depend only on the history at seller i (which is analogous to the sellers not knowing in which order the buyers visit them), then Proposition 3 extends, and the unique equilibrium price is given by
where the cutoff for type θ is determined by v * (θ) − p = δE v|θ max{v − p, v * (θ) − p} . 11 10 The fact that f (v)/[1 − F (v)] → ∞ follows from the assumption that the hazard rate is increasing, so a limit exits, and that v has finite support. With infinite support, this condition may not hold (e.g. with an exponential distribution, where the hazard rate is constant).
11 Details can be found in our 2011 working paper.
Conclusion
This paper considered a classic Coase pricing game, where buyers have an outside option that they may exercise each period, either abandoning their search or moving onto another seller. The outside option leads low value buyers to exit the market rather than delay consumption, countering the negative selection that drives the Coase conjecture. This has a stark effect -there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges the monopoly price in every period, and buyers either immediately purchase or exit. By embedding the single-seller model into a search framework and endogenizing the outside option, this result also simplifies pricing in a search model, providing a foundation for the traditional price-posting assumption.
Our monopoly pricing result is stark and should not be taken too literally: Section 1. A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
A.1 Preliminaries
Consider a sequence of distributions G α of (v, w) such that G α → G 0 (in distribution) as α → 0.
Assume that the limit distribution G 0 has support contained in [0, v] × [w, w] for some w > 0, and has a unique monopoly price. We then wish to show that PBE payoffs under G α converge to the unique PBE payoffs under G 0 as α → 0.
The proof of Proposition 2 is based on the observation that the set of payoff profiles and the set of strategy-belief profiles is compact. The compactness implies that it is enough to show that all convergent sequences of strategy-belief profiles have the same limit payoffs. If we knew that the limit strategy-belief profile is a PBE, we could then invoke a discretized analogue of Proposition 1 to show 12 See Orbach (2004) for discussion of the Alcoa case, and Katz and Shapiro (1999) for Borland and Ashton-Tate.
the uniqueness of limit payoffs. The problem is that a limit of PBEs may not be a PBE itself: In the limit, buyers' actions are optimal given beliefs, but the limit beliefs may fail to satisfy the PBE consistency condition. That is, at some histories h, the limit belief may put positive probability on buyer types outside the support of G 0 (i.e. with w < w). We overcome this problem by showing that an analogue of Proposition 1 obtains when the limit beliefs are consistent on a large set of histories we call H, and then proving that the beliefs are indeed consistent on H.
Let us first introduce some notation and define the set H. At public history h, denote by σ s (h) the strategy of the seller, by σ v,w (h) the strategy of the buyer of type (v, w), and by λ (h) the belief of the seller over buyer types. In particular, σ v,w (h) (a) is the probability that buyer of type (v, w)
takes action a at history h, and λ (h) (v, w) is the probability buyer has type (v, w) at history h. We denote the profile of buyers' strategies by σ = σ s , (σ v,w ) (v,w)∈V ×W . For any profile of strategies σ and beliefs λ, we define H = H (σ, λ) recursively as the smallest set of histories such that:
1. The empty history belongs to H.
If
h ∈ H and a is the seller's action at h, then (h, a) ∈ H.
3. If h ∈ H and a is the buyer's action at h, then (h, a) ∈ H if and only if the belief λ (h) puts strictly positive probability on buyer types (v, w) that take action a with positive probability according to the strategy σ v,w , that is
Intuitively, set H allows for deviations by the seller, but does not allow buyers to take actions outside the support of σ v,w .
We then say that a profile of strategies σ and beliefs λ is a quasi-PBE if (i) the buyers' strategies are optimal given beliefs at any history, and (ii) the seller updates her beliefs according to the Bayes' rule at histories from set H. Importantly, at histories outside H the quasi-PBE allows the seller to put positive probability on any type in V × W , including types not in the support of λ ( ). Of course, any PBE is a quasi-PBE, but a quasi-PBE does not insist on applying Bayes' rule after the buyer has taken a zero-probability action. In a one-period game, the two concepts coincide.
Next we formulate and prove the analogue of Proposition 1 for quasi-PBE in the discretized model.
Lemma 1*. Suppose p 0 is sufficiently small. In any quasi-PBE, if the seller believes that the buyer's net value is above u at some history from H, then she charges prices above u − p 0 at that history.
The proof of Lemma 1* is similar to the proof of Lemma 1, except we wish to show that p(h) ≥ history h 2 that belong to H, and the buyers put probability 1 on continuation histories from H. Thus Lemma 1* implies that type u(h 2 ) expects to obtain at most δ(v − u(h 2 ) + p 0 ) and, if p 0 < 1−δ δ w, strictly prefers to exit and obtain w instead. Intuitively, if the lowest net value buyer delays he obtains rents at most δp 0 , but he gives up the rental value of the outside option (1 − δ)w. Hence all buyers purchase immediately or exit for any initial p 1 in any quasi-PBE. Since we assumed that there is a unique monopoly price and the price grid is sufficiently fine, there is an essentially unique static PBE (see footnote 8) , and an essentially unique quasi-PBE to the entire game.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We endow the set of profiles of strategies and beliefs (σ, λ) with the standard product topology. Since all buyer types' net values are bounded above by v we can restrict attention to strategies in which all prices come from the compact subgrid Γ = kp 0 | k = 0, 1, 2, ... Tychonoff's Theorem, the set of strategy-belief profiles is compact in the product topology over histories h.
Given a strategy-belief profile (σ, λ), let Π = Π s , (Π v,w ) (v,w)∈V ×W be the profile of expected payoffs at the null history . Observe that payoffs Π are continuous in (σ, λ). This follows because discounting and the boundedness of per-period payoffs imply that periods in the far future have a negligible impact on initial payoffs. Thus product-topology convergence of strategy-belief profiles on any finitely long set of histories implies the convergence of payoffs obtained at these histories.
Let Π * ∈ R × R V ×W be the unique profile of expected payoffs that, by Proposition 1*, obtains in all quasi-PBE under G 0 . We wish to show that any sequence of strategy-belief profiles (σ α , λ α ) that form a PBE for initial belief G α induces payoffs Π α that converge to Π * in the standard topology on R × R V ×W as α → 0. Let us initially consider the case when the sequence of strategy-belief profiles is convergent.
Claim. If the sequence of strategy-belief profiles (σ α , λ α ) converges as α → 0, then the sequence of payoff profiles Π α converges to Π * in the standard topology on R × R V ×W .
To prove the claim denote by σ 0 , λ 0 the limit of (σ α , λ α ) as α → 0. Second, to show that the limit profile satisfies the consistency conditions of a quasi-PBE, we need to check the seller updates his beliefs according to Bayes' rule at histories from the set H = H σ 0 , λ 0 :
1. At the empty history the seller's belief is λ 0 ( ) = lim α→0 λ α ( ) = lim α→0 G α = G 0 , and hence agrees with the distribution of buyer types G 0 .
If
h ∈ H and a is the seller's action at h, then beliefs λ α are unaffected by the choice of a, and so λ 0 = lim α→0 λ α are also unaffected.
3. If h ∈ H and a is the buyer's action at h such that The limit beliefs λ 0 are thus consistent with the limit strategies σ 0 , and the limit strategy-belief profile σ 0 , λ 0 is a quasi-PBE. By Proposition 1*, the limit strategy-belief profile induces payoffs Π * .
As the payoffs are continuous in the strategy-belief profile, so the sequence of payoffs Π α converges to Π * . This proves the claim.
